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Abstract
Post-work politics, with a focus on universal basic income, rather than an agenda of saving
jobs and improving the quality of work, has been a growth area on the left. This article chal-
lenges the views of proponents that their claims are ‘on trend’ with developments in markets
and technology. It does so by examining two supposed ‘tipping points’ concerning crises in
the production of value in capitalism and in the availability of and attachment to work.
Through a rigorous examination of available evidence, the article demonstrates that the sto-
ries contained in post-work discourses about business models, technologies, labour markets
and workers are not empirically sustainable. Suggestions are then made about what more
credible accounts of actually existing capital, technology and labour might look like, and
what the direction of alternative, progressive policy agendas might be.
Keywords: post-work, post-capitalism, automation, business models, ﬁnancialisation, quality
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Introduction
POST-WORK POLITICS, as pursued on the left,
draws on a variety of normative and empiri-
cal claims. For the purposes of this article
the former (the preferred outcomes) are set
aside in order to focus on the latter (the out-
comes predicted). In political debate, empiri-
cal evidence, underpinned by guiding
concepts, is rightly seen as a precondition of
plausibility. Paradigm shift perspectives—of
which post-work politics is a variant—re-
quire evidence that their claims are ‘on
trend’ with developments in markets and
technology and this is exactly what we
observe in claims made by leading propo-
nents such as Paul Mason, Nick Srnicek and
Alex Williams.
Such claims are associated with overlap-
ping perspectives. Some come from a speciﬁ-
cally post-work politics that relies primarily
on assertions concerned with the effects of
automation. Optimism on the prospects for
the latter is fuelled by the view that ‘machi-
nes can increasingly produce all necessary
goods and services’. Others can be located in
the discourse of post-capitalism, whose
object is value and proﬁts at a macro and
micro economic level. In both instances, the
transformative powers of science and tech-
nology are the primary perceived drivers.1
However, there is another link. It is the
contention of this article that these claims are
held together by the idea that the worlds of
business and work have reached a tipping
point, or points. Various structural obstacles
mean that capitalism can no longer supply
the proﬁtable business models or the jobs
that can raise productivity, ﬁnd proﬁtable
new markets or sustain a viable economic
and political order. A paradigm shift
towards something variously described as
full luxury communism, a post-work society
or a collaborative, network economy is not
only desirable, but inexorable. The centrality
of the demand for a universal basic income
(UBI) is the logical outcome of tipping point
perspectives, summed up in a much-lauded
grafﬁti sprayed on a wall in Paris in 2018 by
the far-left wing of the gilet jaunes: ‘we want
some money now while we are waiting for
communism’.
In articulating a case for a ‘world without
work’, it needs to be asked which world we
are talking about. Such discourses are heav-
ily skewed towards the advanced capitalist
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economies and are either uninterested in, or
blissfully unaware of, job growth or wide-
spread informal work, or technological
capacities and economic conditions in the
Global South. However, given the absence of
serious coverage of this kind, our focus has
to be on the claims that post-work thinkers
actually do make.
The problem with twin tipping point argu-
ments is that they are not true and therefore
lead the left in some misleading and mis-
taken policy directions. By ‘not true’ I mean
the stories they are telling about business
models, technologies, labour markets and
workers are not, by and large, empirically
sustainable. The article sets out the dimen-
sions and sources of tipping point claims
and critically interrogates them, before sug-
gesting what more credible and empirically
grounded stories about actually existing cap-
ital, technology and labour might look like,
and what the direction of alternative, pro-
gressive policy agendas might be.2
Tipping point 1: post-capitalism?
Where do ideas about post-capitalism come
from? The main derivation is from schools of
‘autonomist’ or ‘post workerist’ Marxism
linked with the well-known ideas of Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri and less prominent
theorists of cognitive capitalism.3 In such frame-
works, knowledge value in a third stage of
capitalism (or post-capitalism) increasingly dis-
places value created through labour in produc-
tion. Such value is created through the ‘general
intellect’ at work and in social life more gener-
ally. The concept of the general intellect is taken
from Marx’s ‘Fragment on machines’, a short
set of speculative notes about a possible future
that was part of the Grundrisse.4 In this hypo-
thetical future, scientiﬁc knowledge will become
the source of wealth, reversing the subordina-
tion of labour facilitated by capital’s previous
appropriation of science and technology and
providing the basis for the end of scarcity and
the transition to (full luxury) communism.
Inside the workplace, autonomous labour can-
not be commanded or measured, whilst exter-
nally, knowledge value and information start to
corrode the price mechanism—especially in the
digital, internet sectors which become the lead-
ing edge of the new economy. As the old
economy shrivels, a new form arises: the spon-
taneous rise of collaborative production of
goods and services that no longer needs to
respond to the discipline of the market and
managerial hierarchy.5
The second source is from knowledge
economy and informational capitalism theo-
ries in both social science and popular busi-
ness literatures. In essence, we ﬁnd the same
claims about knowledge value, shorn of the
Marxist language, as well as the same hype
about the rise of horizontal networks. When
the cost of producing goods and services
shrinks to near zero the entire rationale of
capitalism becomes meaningless.6 The dis-
ruptive capacities of technological innovation
(notably AI, big data analytics) is held to be
the ultimate driver, facilitating an integrated
network of smart products and markets.
Hybrid companies in the sharing economy
such as Uber and Airbnb are bridgeheads or
precursors to a fully collaborative commons.
Many such arguments appear in Jeremy Rif-
kin’s Age of Access, one of the latest in a
stream of speculative ﬁctions that move on
to the next paradigm break before the audi-
ence has worked out that the last one hadn’t
happened.7 Rifkin (and similar business writ-
ers) have also been a key source for Mason,
as well as for Hardt and Negri. Assertions
that the internet is ‘inherently designed’ to
be open and a universally accessible dis-
tributed network also remind us of a parallel
technologically determinist inﬂuence on
post-capitalist thought, the techno-populists
and cyber-utopians.
Critique
There is some recognition amongst post-capi-
talist commentators that there are some
obstacles to at least a more rapid tipping
point. These include the creation of monopo-
lies to restrict access, extract rent (as proﬁt
substitute) and maintain scarcity. However,
these measures are treated largely as resi-
dues of the old and the last throw of dino-
saur corporations, swimming against the
current. But this is wrong—they are (part of)
the current.
To understand actually existing capital, it
makes sense to look at the largest ﬁrms and
their revenues. Of the top ﬁfty companies
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globally by revenue—which seems a reason-
able place to start given claims about prof-
itability—sixteen are ﬁnancial corporations,
nine energy or extractive, seven auto, six
retail and the rest a mixture of health, elec-
tronics, telecoms, construction, pharmaceuti-
cals, conglomerates and electronics. Only
four of these ﬁrms had declining revenue in
the latest year. And only two tech giants—
Apple and Amazon—appear in the list,
though the picture would look a little differ-
ent if the criteria was market capitalisation.8
It is simply untrue that the kind of sectors
and (implied) business models used in post-
capitalist projections dominate the global
economy. The archetypal companies of this
era of capitalism are just as, if not more,
likely to be Shell, Walmart, RB Hathaway,
Toyota, Samsung, Axa and Glencore. This is
not to dismiss the three A’s (Apple, Amazon,
Alphabet). Firms can be archetypal in differ-
ent ways—for example, for their growth
strategies, their employment models and
their supply chains. It is a question of pro-
portion and plausibility.
Such data does not explicitly reveal how
such ﬁrms make their money. There are
clearly a variety of business models in play. It
is important to resist the hype that the digital
somehow deﬁnes the economy, as in termi-
nology such as platform capitalism. ‘Platform’
suffers from classic conceptual and empirical
over-stretch. Its emphasis on the software
bringing together producers and consumers
conﬂates quite different business models
(Uber’s contracts/algorithmic controls, Face-
book with its targeted advertising based on
the extraction of user data), and obscures
ownership and hierarchical power relations.9
Given the variety of business models
within and beyond the digital sector, it is
important to chart some of the central
trends. Research from radical political econ-
omy scholars in recent decades shows that
the global economy is organised primarily
through complex value and commodity
chains.10 Chains can be thought of as com-
plex networks of buyers, suppliers and inter-
mediaries, with various ‘nodes’. Production
of goods and services is often fragmented as
larger players use outsourcing and other
measures to reduce direct involvement in
production, decrease input costs and focus
on the most proﬁtable activities. Contrary to
the image of collaborative, horizontal rela-
tions, they are characterised by concentration
of capital and centralisation of power. The
key role in both buyer and producer-driven
chains is played by oligopolistic lead ﬁrms.
Concentration and centralisation of capital,
notably through merger and acquisition,
facilitates high market capitalisation and
securing of strategic assets that strengthen
brand power. Fragmented production net-
works increase competition between rivals,
allowing lead ﬁrms to capture value within
the chain from suppliers and workers. Look
in detail at any of the business models of
ﬁrms such as Walmart, Apple and Glencore
and this is what you will ﬁnd.
With respect to concentration, the proﬁt
share of the top 200 largest US corporations
doubled between 1950 and the mid-2000s.11
A recent report for the Resolution Founda-
tion found that the proportion of revenue
accounted for by the largest 100 UK ﬁrms
(23 per cent) had risen by a quarter since
2003–4 and concentration has increased in
two-thirds of industries.12 Uncomfortably for
post-capitalist perspectives this is equally, if
not more, the case in the internet sector.
Media and entertainment industry concentra-
tion is a long-term trend and the online
giants have continued it. For example, the
acquisition of Instagram by Facebook has
created a unique fusion of economic, political
and social power. As numerous net critics,
often former insiders, have noted, web based
quasi-monopolies, ironically, utilise and then
monetise users’ social networks within
enclosed eco-systems. Commons-based peer
production initiatives such as Wikipedia are,
unfortunately, not remotely typical of the
sector, let alone the capitalist economy. More
broadly, it has become obvious to all but
the most dedicated boosters that the sharing
economy, with its narrative of social reciproc-
ity and neutral bridge-building between users
and providers of services, is a ﬁction. Compa-
nies such as Uber have built a business model
that requires workers to be treated as inde-
pendent contractors subject to algorithmic
control. Along with others, such as Airbnb,
they leverage their status as intermediary plat-
forms and access to data to enter and build
market power.
None of this is meant to argue that such
business models are stable or guarantees of
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proﬁtability; merely that in many cases they
persist and prosper. Alongside concentration
and centralisation, ﬁnancialisation is the
other and, arguably, most signiﬁcant trend
underpinning contemporary business mod-
els. In this context, ﬁnancialisation refers to
the growing inﬂuence of capital markets on
the behaviour of non-ﬁnancial corporations
(and state actors). The pursuit of shareholder
value becomes the primary object, displacing
older retain and invest models. If we return
to the global value chain territory, pressure
to meet targets for return on capital
employed, and to increase income streams
for shareholders, explains much of the slicing
up of the chain through offshoring and sub-
contracting. Firms are increasingly treated as
bundles of disposable assets from which
value can be leveraged. Corporate gover-
nance and strategy become increasingly
focussed on delivering stock market expecta-
tions, set through valuation models and
metrics used by institutional investors.13
Mechanisms include perpetual restructuring,
ﬁnancial engineering, enhanced focus on div-
idends to shareholders and, in the case of
private equity, servicing debt. Though there
are new forms of value extraction, again con-
trary to post-capitalist arguments about
value in production, much of the cost recov-
ery is through labour and the labour process
in terms of headcount reduction, perfor-
mance targets and work intensiﬁcation, as
well as value transfers impacting on worker
wages, pensions and beneﬁts.
Even if we focus on the micro economy
rather than the conditions that led to the glo-
bal ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, ﬁnancialisation is
a far better explanation for the crises and
contradictions of contemporary capitalism
than automation or zero-cost production. For
example, if it was automation, we would see
evidence of far greater investment in physi-
cal and human capital and in innovation.
Instead, we have deep-seated productivity
problems, at least in the most neoliberal
regimes where ﬁnancialisation ﬂourishes rel-
atively unchecked.14 Total business invest-
ment represents a smaller proportion of GDP
than in previous decades. Firms are not short
of money, but liquid assets and balance
sheet capital have been used to pay divi-
dends and engage in share buy-backs to
keep market value high.
Digital and other advanced technologies
are better understood for their role in coordi-
nating inter and intra-ﬁrm activities and in
managing work and workers. On-demand
business models, such as those in the logis-
tics sector, require companies to use software
to track the ﬂow of goods and labour
required across their outsourced services
supplied to various clients. The same pro-
cesses can be used to track the performance
of employees. The latter is described by War-
hurst and Hunt as the ‘digitalization of
workers’.15 This is repeated in different forms
in other sectors. Amazon is notorious for its
intensive monitoring and treatment of ware-
house workers. But the practices are wider,
even though the driver of the technological
subordination of labour may also be indirect.
When Amazon took over Whole Foods Mar-
ket it imposed an inventory management
system ostensibly aimed at cutting down
waste. Yet recent reports indicate a massive
ramping up of work intensity through data
input, scorecards and job cuts.16 Workforce
management software—WFM—that focusses
on scheduling work and monitoring time,
attendance and performance, can have simi-
lar effects for on-demand labour in sectors
such as care, retail and security. What some
call the quantiﬁed workplace is not necessar-
ily typical of all sectors, tending to prolifer-
ate in those that operate on low margins and
those where monitoring can be exercised
through crowdsourcing platforms. However,
with the spread of people analytics and
other types of digital Taylorism, we can con-
ﬁdently say that science and technology
have not reached a point where they are no
longer appropriated by capital for its own
ends.
Tipping point 2: post-work?
In this sphere, the tipping point claims con-
sist of overlapping crises of access and
attachment to jobs. In a nutshell, most peo-
ple hate their jobs, which is fortuitous
because most of them are going to disappear
because of automation. Exit from work is
good for everybody, as ‘that job is unneces-
sary either for your well-being or for the
well-being of others’.17 In their inﬂuential
accelerationist text, Srnicek and Williams
claim that a rising ‘surplus population’ is
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emerging on the back of a technologically
triggered crisis of work.18
Before we unpack these claims, let’s start
with some potential common ground. There
is a lot to dislike in contemporary work
trends.19 Many people work too much, either
because of long hours, or excessive demands.
Though we have historically high levels of
employment, too many of those jobs are low
quality, under-rewarded, insecure, stressful
and over-managed. Though this varies
hugely across ﬁrms and occupations, there is
a growing gap between what work—as spec-
iﬁed by many employers—wants of us and
what we want from work. Unsurprisingly,
even corporate surveys show low levels of
employee engagement and increased cyni-
cism. The leap from these observations to
supposedly widespread hatred for jobs may
seem logical, but that would be a mistake.20
We have not reached a work identity tipping
point. It’s not obvious where such claims
derive from—certainly not from academic
studies. The same survey and case studies
evidence summarised above also shows high
levels of work attachment and identity. The
reports of disengagement refer to the ﬁrm
and its broken promises and poor practices
rather than the work itself. There is, of
course, the much-touted YouGov survey on
the back of David Graeber’s ‘bullshit jobs’
argument.21 Despite a loaded question
—‘does your job make a meaningful contri-
bution to the world?’—the result was still 63
per cent saying it did.22 Sources of work
attachment are varied, ranging from the
intrinsic to the instrumental, but they are
real and persistent and cannot be written off
as the externally imposed effects of an out-
dated work ethic. Nor is it the case that
strong attachments are conﬁned to or corre-
lated with higher paid or skilled jobs. For
example, low paid care workers report
strong intrinsic satisfaction alongside low
pay and difﬁcult conditions.23 Conversely,
professional workers can and do enjoy the
positive features of their circumstances,
whilst kicking back against threats to their
autonomy, work–life balance or pensions.
The complexity and contradictory nature
of work treatment and attachment was
illustrated in a recent BBC news report on
an accident and emergency department
under increasing pressure. A senior nurse
interviewed said that she loved and hated
her job on the same day.
In principle, post-work tipping point per-
spectives don’t need workers to hate their
jobs if they are going to disappear anyway.
Admittedly, this core claim sits somewhat
uneasily with current record levels of
employment. However, claims resting on
future projections associated with the threat
of automation appear to be stronger. After
all, it is true that robots and AI (such as
machine learning) could replace some routine
tasks. A strong version of this claim, propa-
gated in a clutch of futurist texts from aca-
demics and consultants, functions as the
empirical heart of tipping point arguments.
Of these texts, the claim made by two engi-
neering science academics, Carl Benedikt
Frey and Michael Osborne, that 47 per cent
of US jobs were ‘vulnerable’ to automation
has had the greatest impact.24 The language
is of vulnerability, susceptibility and risk, yet
in the process of endless repetition and circu-
lation, might has largely become will happen.
Robotics and machine learning linked to big
data analytics will reach beyond the routine
to the cognitive. The higher the potential ﬁg-
ure, the more it tends to be embraced on the
normative, aspirational shores of post-work
punditry, for whom, as noted earlier, almost
all jobs could and should be automated.
The limits of automation
Let’s stick closer to the claims and examine
the ‘methodology’ of Frey and Osborne.25
They say that ‘automatability’ of the job is a
function of the skills required to complete
the task. They then subject a subset of a
dataset of occupations to this test in order to
come up with the susceptibility ﬁgure. There
are two fundamental problems of condition-
ality and context with this approach, which
is broadly typical of the genre. First, job,
tasks and occupation are confused and con-
ﬂated. This matters. ‘Jobs’ are an amalgam
of particular divisions of labour and employ-
ment/contractual relations. Tasks can be
removed or conﬁgured through the design
and application of technologies without elim-
inating the job, let alone the complex and
heterogeneous construction ‘occupation’.
Talk of automatability outside the context of
actual labour processes and employer uses
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of labour power (skills, dispositions, emo-
tions, formal and tacit knowledge and so on)
is misleading. In particular, it cannot be
addressed through algorithms that search
occupational databases for routineness or
similar categories.
The second overlapping problem is that a
focus on bundles of skills is the absence of
any consideration of the political economy of
automation, particularly though the business
models of ﬁrms. Like any other fundamental
decision about the technical division of
labour, the introduction of robotics or AI
will be driven primarily by their value
proposition and cost considerations. There
will be circumstances in which those consid-
erations will lead to the elimination of jobs
or roles, especially in the case of information
handling and machine learning. In many
others, the fact that something can be auto-
mated does not mean it will be. Many
expanding sectors (hospitality, warehousing,
platform working) operate low margin busi-
ness models that rest on the ﬂexible and
intensive utilisation of labour. Introducing
robots would be expensive and largely irrele-
vant. Also, as argued earlier, technology is
already performing a crucial role in coordi-
nation and direction of the labour and intra-
ﬁrm processes .
Then there is the issue of dominant busi-
ness models at a higher, aggregate level.
Financialisation is the dominant trend in
accumulation regimes. At the strategic and
operational level, as the research of econo-
mists such as Marianna Mazzucato has
shown, corporate decisions are disposed
towards asset utilisation (including labour)
and enhancing income streams for share-
holders against investment in physical and
human capital and therefore innovation.26
This tallies with the widely observed point
that substantial new technological inputs are
inconsistent with the weak or stagnant pro-
ductivity growth ﬁgures for the past decade.
These problems underpin much of the criti-
cal commentary made by a range of bodies
as diverse as the OECD, the Scottish govern-
ment, the Resolution Foundation, the Eco-
nomic Policy Institute and the Roosevelt
Institute. As a comprehensive report for the
Roosevelt Institute puts it, ‘While it is chal-
lenging to know what the future holds, the
data are clear. We are not in the middle of a
labor displacing technological boom, nor are
we on the verge of rapid technological
change in the near future’.27 Aside from pro-
ductivity ﬁgures, they point to data from the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics that show very
little employment churn, which would be
expected if automation was displacing work-
ers. Eighty-ﬁve case studies by Leslie Wil-
locks and Mary Lacity found that AI was
‘notably absent’ from most organisations in
the USA and Asia-Paciﬁc.28 Such ﬁndings
are conﬁrmed in the authoritative OECD
study that found an average of 9 per cent
automatability across twenty-one countries.29
Crucially they rejected an occupational-based
approach in favour of a task-based one.
It is of course true that the complex
macro and micro contingencies discussed
above make projections of aggregate job
losses owing to automation problematic.
However, if the future is difﬁcult, we also
have the past: we have been here before. In
every previous wave of technological
change, catastrophism has dominated public
and policy discourse. The predilection of
parts of the left to technological determinism
and ‘capitalism in ﬁnal crisis’ scenarios
makes them willing fellow travellers. Left
commentators in the 1980s used to produce
books with titles heralding the ‘end of work’
or the ‘jobless future’ to describe the effects
of the microprocessor ‘revolution’. Studies of
the labour process in that period rightly
identiﬁed the loss of traditional skills as a
result of the application of such technolo-
gies, but did not adequately grasp the ways
in which new ones would emerge as
employers and employees negotiated the
changing technical division of labour. Tasks
were augmented, degraded and boundaries
redrawn far more than whole jobs and occu-
pations eliminated. As the American econo-
mist David Autor has observed, tasks that
cannot be substituted by automation are
generally complemented by it.30 Further-
more, that doesn’t even consider the emer-
gence of new jobs that are facilitated by
new technologies or by the restless drive of
capital to extend the scope of the commod-
ity form into new social and spatial territo-
ries. From 1989 to 2017, there was a net
gain of 118 million jobs in the US economy,
yet we are now back to extreme pessimism
on job creation prospects.
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Job trends
Though not perfect—for example some
methods use pay as a proxy for skill level—
the most plausible way of assessing both the
likely patterns of job creation and their vul-
nerability to automation is to look at current
and projected job growth trends. The US
Bureau of Labor Statistics produces far more
detailed assessments than its UK counter-
part. If we examine Table 1, the core trends
are reasonably clear.
There is little sign of an economy domi-
nated by the kind of knowledge and imma-
terial labour projected in cognitive capitalism
perspectives. Job growth is in two main clus-
ters. The dominant trend is the further
growth of interactive and personal service
roles. Paul Mason says that a future econ-
omy can’t generate enough new post-mod-
ern servants. Maybe so, but it doesn’t have
to. Sectors such as health, social care, clean-
ing and hospitality have been long-term
sources of growth, with surely unmet needs
(such as aged and childcare provision) still
to come. The second, smaller grouping
brings together higher-level IT and systems
roles, general managers and some profes-
sional services such as accountants. Again,
these are long-term growth areas, although
we could see some reconﬁguring and re-
badging around digitalisation. These trends
represent the widely-observed and continu-
ing polarisation in the occupational struc-
ture, with a shrinkage in the proportion of
skilled and mid-level jobs.31 The exceptions,
in this table at least, are construction, trans-
port and maintenance. The other growth
area, though poorer paid and more precari-
ous, has been in warehousing and logistics,
typiﬁed by Amazon ‘fulﬁlment centres’. The
basic trends are consistent with evidence clo-
ser to home. In their commentary on
automation and the UK labour market, the
Resolution Foundation charts rising employ-
ment shares for high and low-paid jobs in
the last twenty years, with a ‘hollowing out’
in the middle.32 The largest percentage
Table 1: Projected job change 2016–26 (thousands), United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics




Total, all occupations 11,518.6 $37,040
Personal care aides 754.0 $21,920
Combined food preparation and serving workers,
including fast food
579.9 $19,440
Registered nurses 437.0 $68,450
Home health aides 425.6 $22,600
Software developers, applications 253.4 $100,080
Janitors and cleaners, except maids and housekeeping
cleaners
233.0 $24,190
General and operations managers 205.9 $99,310
Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand 200.8 $25,980
Medical assistants 184.6 $31,540
Waiters and waitresses 182.5 $19,990
Nursing assistants 164.0 $26,590
Construction laborers 153.3 $33,430
Cooks, restaurant 145.3 $24,140
Accountants and auditors 140.3 $68,150
Customer service representatives 136.0 $32,300
Market research analysts and marketing specialists 136.0 $62,560
Medical secretaries 129.1 $33,730
Landscaping and groundskeeping workers 123.3 $26,320
Heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers 113.8 $41,340
Maintenance and repair workers, general 112.7 $36,940
Teacher assistants 109.5 $25,410
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growth in Scotland has been in low skilled
occupations, including caring, leisure and
‘other service’ occupations, while one in four
new jobs in the recent period in Ireland com-
ing from hospitality, with the next largest
sector being construction.33
The key point about job trends is that they
reinforce scepticism about the medium-term
impact of automation. The higher-end clus-
ter of IT and professional jobs are complex
and knowledge-intensive. The larger, lower-
end service jobs mostly rest on business
models that extract value from forms of
labour power drawing on a variety of ‘soft
skills’ and tacit knowledge, where human
interaction would be difﬁcult or counter-
productive to automate. Take waiters and
waitresses, who have a 94 per cent auto-
matability rating in Frey and Osborne’s
study. There may be areas of fast food
where automation makes business sense, but
for most restaurants, coffee shops and other
hospitality contexts, the social interaction
with the customer is integral to the value
proposition. ‘Routineness’ does not easily
map on to such jobs.
There are growth areas, notably truck
driving and warehouse picking and packing,
that are ultimately more susceptible to robots
or AI. However, the key word is ultimately.
We are decades away from large-scale use of
the much-hyped driverless vehicles on nor-
mal roads. As for picking and packing,
robots are expensive and still lack the dexter-
ity and mobility of human labour, which is
part of the reason for the absence so far of
signiﬁcant robotisation.
Conclusion: politics and policy
The problem with the suggestion of the UBI
as a solution to some of these issues is that it
is a solution to attachment and job destruc-
tion crises that do not exist, at least not in
the forms claimed. If UBI is a solution to
another problem—for example, the coercive
and commodiﬁed nature of wage labour
under capitalism—that’s ﬁne, but good luck
trying to persuade the electorate with that
one. Policy agendas need to be driven by the
immediate to medium-term challenges aris-
ing from actually existing business models,
labour processes and markets. Those chal-
lenges are varied and numerous.
The real job or work crises are not
expressed in single or simple ways; therefore
no one-size-ﬁts-all policy prescription is
appropriate. Take one example: there is a
need for a more explicit politics of time.
While it would be a good idea if most peo-
ple worked less, a demand for something
like a universal four-day week is too blunt
an instrument. A sizeable minority of the
workforce wants to work more. Ofﬁce for
National Statistics data reveal that 14.6 per
cent of UK workers are doing ‘involuntary’
part-time work. This is a huge problem that
contributes to in-work poverty. The ﬁgure
has increased by more than 40 per cent in
the UK and USA since 2006. At the other
end of the spectrum, one in ten workers are
‘over-employed’ and would like to work
less, even if it meant a pay cut. Under-
employment is clearly part of rising labour
market insecurity, but again, this comes in
different forms. There has rightly been
considerable emphasis placed on job insecu-
rity associated with the ‘gig economy’. The
struggle in on-demand platform work has
focussed on challenging the independent
contractor status that underpins the capacity
of such companies to transfer costs and risks
to labour. The Taylor Review did not
address this issue adequately and tended to
overstate the extent to which the downsides
of ‘modern work are conﬁned to ‘gigs’.34 A
report for the RSA estimates that at least one
in seven employees experience ‘chronically
precarious’ practices.35 Importantly, many
are full-time employees and the insecurity is
within work (poor conditions and treatment)
as well as access to it. In contrast, ‘acutely
precarious’ workers, including those on zero-
hour contracts or in multiple jobs, are more
likely to be on non-standard contracts.
It is important to remember the earlier
point that most work is not precarious and
that most employees enjoy aspects of their
work. A contemporary and comprehensive
politics of work needs to focus on the things
that they do not enjoy, notably stagnant
wages, rising work intensity and declining
autonomy associated with excessive demands,
blurring of work–life boundaries and punitive
performance regimes. In many occupations,
growing work strain is the result. The prob-
lem, as I’ve argued elsewhere is bullshit in the
job, rather than bullshit jobs per se.36
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The key point about the above changes is
that none of them are the result of automa-
tion, though some (such as work intensity)
are sometimes linked to employer uses of
new technologies. Chronic and acute precari-
ousness and excessive work demands are the
result of choices by employers and govern-
ments. Technological catastrophism obscures
the agency involved in the making of these
choices and the potential agency in unmak-
ing them. Technological determinism inhibits
the latter as there only appear to be two
choices, Luddism or passivity, as we wait
for automation and UBI.
One positive effect of the work futures
debate is that it has created an opening for a
renewed, but more realistic policy agenda
around job quality: any job is not better than
none. For example, a recent study found that
unemployed people who found good quality
jobs experienced big improvements in their
mental health, whereas those who secured
jobs characterised by two or more adverse
quality measures had outcomes no different
from those who remained unemployed.37 By
more realistic I mean abandoning the illusion
that all work can be upskilled and all dis-
placed workers can be re-trained for a high
skill, digital role. That is simply inconsistent
with the patterns of job growth. We have to
learn to live with ‘low skilled work’, while
making it more secure, better rewarded and
with improved conditions.38 Many of these
issues can be addressed through labour mar-
ket regulation, as well as moves to make it
easier for unions to organise and bargain. A
progressive agenda would use the govern-
ment commitment (following the Taylor
Review) to be accountable for the quality as
well as the quantity of jobs as leverage for a
much more ambitious programme that also
learns from the Fair Work Commission in
Scotland.
However, many practices that diminish
job security and quality are rooted in low-
cost, ﬁnance-driven business models. Again,
post-work, post-capitalist narratives, with
their emphases on sharing, collaborative
economies, knowledge value and zero-cost
reproduction, get in the way of realistic, pro-
gressive policy agendas. If concentration and
ﬁnancialisation of capital are the main dri-
vers of destructive business models, the
logical direction is of policies aimed at
deconcentration through greater competition,
regulatory oversight and promotion of more
diverse forms of ownership. With respect to
ﬁnancialisation, measures need to incentivise
long-term investment in human and physical
capital (including more robots!), while
inhibiting ﬁnancial engineering distributive
returns based on maximising shareholder
value. This can encompass policies designed
to change corporate governance and company
law, the nature and frequency of reporting
mechanisms, de-linking executive pay from
share options/prices, limiting share buy-backs,
as well as creating countervailing stakeholder
power, including workers on boards.39
Such policies are part of a wider agenda
to re-balance the economy away from a
ﬁnance-led growth regime towards one that
measures and promotes GDP and national
income in different ways, developing a green
new deal that can also be an engine of
higher quality job creation. Re-balancing also
has a spatial dimension: future job growth
will happen, but will be uneven across
regions, particularly for high skilled opportu-
nities. Government—at various levels—needs
to be much more interventionist in its incen-
tives and investments, particularly as the
effects of Brexit ripple through what is left of
the UK’s manufacturing base.
In conclusion, whether you want to
change or replace capitalism, you need to
understand the nature of the beast. Claims
that we are at a post-capitalist, post-work
tipping point do not stand up to scrutiny no
matter how many times its proselytisers
appear on the telly or radio.
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